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“ A N D  A L W A Y S  K E E P  A - H O L D  O F  N U R S E , 
F O R  F E A R  O F  F I N D I N G  S O M E T H I N G 
W O R S E ” 1:  C H A L L E N G I N G  R A P E  M Y T H S  
I N  T H E  C O U R T R O O M
Jennifer Temkin*
Radical reform of the law of rape and the evidential rules surrounding it, 
changes in police procedures, the setting up of Sexual Assault Referral Centres 
and many other initiatives to assist victims in England and Wales, whilst en-
tirely worthwhile in themselves, have achieved disappointing results in terms 
of boosting conviction rates. It is now acknowledged that more needs to be done 
to tackle the attitudinal problem that exists in society at large as well as in the 
courtroom with respect to rape cases. his article considers  the value of judicial 
directions as one strategy for achieving this goal.
Since the 1970s, England and Wales have experienced a golden age of law 
reform in relation to sexual ofenses. However, this worthy endeavor has 
by no means resulted in higher conviction rates in rape cases. To the con-
trary, conviction rates, in terms of the proportion of ofenses recorded by 
the police that result in convictions, have dropped markedly over the same 
period.2 here is now growing recognition that one reason for this is the 
power and destructive force of rape myths. he di culty is to settle upon 
*The author is indebted for their assistance to Professor Barbara Krahé and His 
Honour Judge Rook QC.
1. Hilaire Belloc, “Jim,” in Cautionary Tales for Children (1907).
2. In 1979, convictions for rape ofenses in the Crown Court were 32 percent of reported 
cases in the same year. In 2008, the percentage dropped to 6.9. See Home Oice, Ministry 
of Justice (MOJ), Annual Criminal Statistics Supplementary Tables, vol. 2, Table S2.1 (A). 
For further discussion, see below and Jennifer Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process, ch. 1 
(2002).
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methods of dealing with the problem. his article will consider how rape 
myths have come to be seen as an issue that the criminal justice system 
must tackle and will seek to evaluate whether judicial directions can assist 
in fulilling this goal.
I .  T H E  A C H I E V E M E N T S  O F  R E F O R M  I N  E N G L A N D  
A N D  W A L E S
Reform of the law of rape in England and Wales in modern times begins 
with the eforts of the Heilbron Committee in 19753 and the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee in the 1980s.4 But the judges must be given credit for 
beginning the process over a century earlier when they irst articulated the 
principle that the essence of rape is the nonconsent of the victim, which need 
not be manifested by any display of resistance on her part.5 he Heilbron 
Committee’s recommendations resulted in the Sexual Ofences (Amendment) 
Act 1976, and after that legislation proceeded incrementally to dispense with 
the worst excesses of existing law (e.g., the marital rape exemption6 and the 
requirement of a corroboration warning7), and eventually, with the Sexual 
Ofences Act 2003, to put in place a new and enlightened regime of sub-
stantive law. Of cardinal importance is that the law now spells out certain 
principles that, in the case of adults, give primacy to the idea of personal 
autonomy in the sexual sphere so that consent is the touchstone by which all 
sexual encounters are judged. Moreover, rules of evidence have been changed 
to support rather than undermine such principles. he use of sexual history 
evidence has been controlled,8 cross-examination of the complainant by the 
accused himself has been stopped,9 and the complainant may be assisted 
3. he Heilbron Committee, Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape Cmnd. 
6352 (1975).
4. Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC), Working Paper on Sexual Ofences 
(1980); CLRC, Fifteenth Report, Sexual Ofences, Cmnd. 9213 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Camplin 1 Cox CC 220 (1845).
6. he exemption was irst abolished by the judiciary in the landmark judgements of the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in R v. R, see 2 All E.R. 257 [1991]; 4 All E.R. 481, 
HL [1991].his was subsequently ratiied by the legislature in the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994, § 142.
7. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, § 32.
8. See Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YJCEA) 1999, § 41.
9. See YJCEA 1999, § 34.
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in giving evidence through the use of a series of special measures.10 At the 
same time, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which is of general application in 
criminal cases, has ushered in law reform capable of providing considerable 
assistance in the prosecution of sex ofenses by permitting the more liberal 
use of evidence of the defendant’s bad character11 and by softening the law 
on recent complaint and hearsay evidence.12
To complement these changes, there have been widespread improve-
ments in the handling of rape cases by the criminal justice system. For 
example, there is now special training for judges trying serious sexual 
assault cases; since the 1980s police practices have altered substantially to 
take account of victims’ needs13; and more recently, sexual assault referral 
centers (SARCs) have been established throughout the country to as-
sist victims and increase the chances of the collection of useful forensic 
evidence.14
Yet, despite all these successes, it has been demonstrated time and 
again that reform has not yielded results in terms of higher conviction 
rates, and there remains the perception that men are still “getting away 
with rape.”15 Likewise, indings from the British Crime Survey suggest 
that sexual victimization remains a widespread problem in England and 
Wales.16
10. See YJCEA 1999, §§ 19–30.
11. Part 11, ch. 1. See Morgan Harris Burrows, Research into the Impact of Bad Character 
Provisions on the Courts, MOJ Research Series 5/09, March 2009.
12. Part 11, ch. 2. See also R v. Openshaw EWCA (Crim) 556 [2006]; 2 Cr. App. Rep. 
405 [2006].
13. See Jennifer Temkin & Barbara Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question 
of Attitude 191–93 (2008); John Yates, Rape Investigation: A Policing Perspective, 77 
Medico-Legal Journal 70, 74 (2009).
14. See http://rds.homeoice.gov.uk/rds/sexofend1.html. For further improvements in 
the way that the criminal justice system deals with rape cases, see he Stern Review, A 
Report by Baroness Vivien Stern CBE of an Independent Review into How Rape Complaints 
are Handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales 49–50 (2010), http://www.equal-
ities.gov.uk/pdf/Stern_Review_of_Rape_Reporting_1FINAL.pdf.
15. See Still Getting Away with Rape, Channel Four Television, Dispatches, Mar. 16, 
2000, http://www.broadcaster.org.uk/section1/rapecampaign/date_rape_trans.htm.
16. Among adults aged 16–59, 19.5 percent of women had sufered some form of sexual 
assault since the age of 16. Sexual assaults against females, which are the main focus of this 
article, far exceeded sexual assaults against males. See Home Oice, Crime in England and 
Wales, British Crime Survey 2008 –09, vol. 1, ch. 3, Table 3.11, 67 (2008–09) http://www.
homeoice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb1109vol1.pdf.
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I I .  R A P E  A N D  T H E  J U S T I C E  G A P
In 2007–2008, 11,648 ofenses of rape of a female were recorded by the 
police.17 In 2007, 1,725 cases of rape of a female went for trial, of which 
thirty were not tried and 783 resulted in conviction.18 Hence, the vast ma-
jority of recorded ofenses never reached the trial stage, and of those that 
did, under half resulted in conviction. In 2007, for every other violent or 
sexual ofense, convictions exceeded acquittals at trial. Only in the case of 
rape of a female did acquittals exceed convictions: 54 percent of cases of 
rape of a female resulted in an acquittal.19 he number of convictions for 
rape of a female in 2007 was 6.7 percent of the ofenses recorded by the 
police in 2007–2008. he igures for 2008 show a slight improvement: 
12,165 rapes of a female were recorded by the police in England and Wales 
in 2008–2009.20 he total number of defendants sent for trial in 2008 was 
1,714, of whom 1691 were actually tried. Of these, 848 were convicted.21 
hus just over 50 percent of those tried were convicted. his igure is 6.9 
percent of the number of recorded ofenses in 2008–2009.22 Low convic-
tion rates tend to discourage prosecutions, thus creating a vicious circle. 
More disappointing still is that negative accounts of the experience of rape 
complainants within the criminal justice system persist.23
A. The Continuing Quest for Improvement
On the part of women’s organizations and government, there has been no 
relaxation in the drive for improvement to ensure that victims of rape are 
17. Id. at Table 2.04.
18. Ministry of Justice, Criminal Statistics England and Wales 2007, Supplementary 
Tables, vol. 2, Part 1, Table S2.1A, http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/criminalannual-
archive.htm.
19. Id.
20. Home Oice, Crime in England and Wales 2008–09, 32, Table 2.04,  http://www.
homeoice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb1109vol1.pdf.
21. Ministry of Justice, Criminal Statistics Annual Report 2008, Supplementary Tables, 
Vol. 2, Part 1, Table S2.1A, http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/criminalannual.htm.
22. For a diferent view of rape statistics based on an eighteen-month study, see Cheryl 
homas, Are Juries Fair?, Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/10 (2010), http://www.justice.
gov.uk/publications/docs/are-juries-fair-research.pdf.
23. See, e.g., Jacqueline Wheatcroft, Graham Wagstaf & Annmarie Moran, Revictimising 
the Victim? How Rape Victims Experience the UK Legal System, 4 Victims and Ofenders 
265 (2009).
|  N E W  C R I M I N A L  L A W  R E V I E W  | VO L .  13  |  N O .  4  |  FALL  20107 1 4
properly treated by the criminal justice system. For example, in 2006, the 
Oice for Criminal Justice Reform, in a bid to increase conviction rates, 
issued a Consultation Paper24 that considered a variety of options, and a 
small committee was then set up to explore them. In November 2009, Sara 
Payne, the Victims’ Champion, issued a report on rape with recommenda-
tions for immediate action.25 In the same year the Home Oice published 
a strategy for ending violence against women and girls.26 More recently, 
a review led by Baroness Stern into the handling of rape complaints has 
moved away from the emphasis on conviction rates whilst making a host 
of recommendations geared toward assisting victims.27
B. False Beliefs About Rape
One of the major problems currently identiied as being at the heart of 
the failure to make progress both with conviction rates and the fair treat-
ment of victims is the problem of attitude.28 Not without justiication, rape 
myths and stereotypes are perceived to be holding back advances in this 
area. here is a growing recognition that judgments and decisions made 
by police oicers, crown prosecutors, forensic medical examiners (FMEs), 
juries, and judges are not always entirely evidence-based but rather are 
inluenced by erroneous assumptions about rape. Rape myths were irst 
deined by Martha Burt as “prejudicial, stereotyped and false beliefs about 
rape, rape victims and rapists.”29 Gerger and colleagues have further use-
fully deined them as “descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about sexual ag-
gression (i.e., about its scope, causes, context, and consequences) that serve 
24. Oice for Criminal Justice Reform, Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims—
Justice for Victims of Rape: Consultation Paper (2006).
25. Sara Payne, Rape: he Victim Experience Review, Home Oice (2009). See also 
Fawcett Society, Final Report of the Commission on Women and the Criminal Justice 
System, Engendering Justice: From Policy to Practice (2009), http://www.fawcettsociety.
org.uk/documents/Commission%20report%20May%2009.pdf.
26. Home Oice, Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls: A Strategy 
(2009).
27. Stern Review, supra note 14.
28. See, e.g., Temkin and Krahé, supra note 13. Sara Payne’s report highlights the prob-
lem: supra note 25, at 10.
29. Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Support for Rape, 38 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 217, 217 (1980).
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to deny, downplay, or justify sexually aggressive behavior that men commit 
against women.”30
Examples of false beliefs about rape are so many and various that they 
defy the space constraints of this article. However, some of the most dam-
aging include the following:
 1. True rape is rape by a stranger. Other rapes are not “real rapes” but 
more often than not involve misunderstandings or situations where 
both sides are equally blameworthy or where the complainant has 
consented and regretted it afterwards.
 2. True rape mostly takes place in an outdoor location and involves 
physical violence against a victim who does all she can to resist. She is 
consequently bruised, particularly in the genital area. At the very least 
threats of violence are used.
 3. A woman can always prevent rape by ighting of her assailant. It 
therefore follows that, save in very rare circumstances, there is no such 
thing as rape.31
 4. A woman can always withhold consent to sex no matter how drunk 
she is.32
 5. Only stranger rape is really traumatic.
 6. Women have only themselves to blame for rape because of their 
clothes, drinking habits, previous sexual relationships, and risky 
behavior.
 7. Consent to sex can be assumed from mode of dress or certain types 
of behavior, such as lirting or kissing. 
 8. True victims have not reported rape more than once. A person who 
reports rape to the police more than once should be treated with 
suspicion.
 9. Genuine victims report rape immediately.
 10. Genuine victims display great emotion when recounting the events 
in question.
 11. Genuine victims will always give a thoroughly consistent account.
30. Heike Gerger, Hanna Kley, Gerd Bohner, & Frank Siebler, he Acceptance of 
Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA) Scale: Development and Validation in 
German and English, 33 Aggressive Behavior 422 (2007).
31. his is the most extreme of all the myths and conlicts with other myths.
32. See Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape 
Cases Involving Intoxicants, 45 Brit. J. Criminology 25 (2005).
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 12. False allegations of rape are very common and constitute a large 
proportion of rapes reported to the police.33
he myths of rape may be challenged on at least four diferent grounds. 
First, many of the beliefs cited here are not merely false but have no bearing 
on criminal liability in England and Wales. hus, it matters not as far as 
the law is concerned whether the assailant was a stranger or where the rape 
took place. here is no legal requirement that violence or threats be used 
or that the complainant should sufer injury, and even if her own behavior 
could be regarded as foolish, this is entirely irrelevant to the criminal li-
ability of the accused.34 Hence, any acquittal based purely on myths 1, 2, or 
6 would be blatantly in contravention of the law.
Secondly, some beliefs about rape are self-evidently false. Given the obvi-
ous disparities in strength between most men and most women, it is clear that 
women cannot always prevent rape by ighting of the assailant. Similarly, a 
person who is so drunk as to be “blotto” or “legless” may well be unable to 
express lack of consent by words or actions.35 Myths, 3, 4 and 7 arguably defy 
common sense and can be discounted on that ground alone.
hirdly, certain beliefs about rape are well known to be false. In R v. 
Doody 36 it was stated that it is well known that the feelings of shame and 
guilt that may accompany a rape might inhibit a woman from making a 
complaint immediately (myth 9). his was held to justify a judicial direc-
tion on the matter.
Fourthly, research reveals the falsity of many other common beliefs about 
rape. For example, extensive psychological and psychiatric research into the 
impact of rape has conclusively demonstrated that many victims sufer 
from rape trauma syndrome37 or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)38 
33. See, e.g., Opinion Matters, Report prepared for the Havens (Sexual Assault Referral 
Centres), Wake Up to Rape, Research Summary Report 8 (2010), http://www.thehavens.
co.uk/docs/Havens_Wake_Up_To_Rape_Report_Summary.pdf.
34. See the Sexual Ofences Act 2003, § 1.
35. See R v. Malone, 2 Cr. App. R. 447 [1998].
36. EWCA (Crim) 2557 [2008]; Crim. L. Rev. 591 [2009].
37. See, e.g., Ann W. Burgess & Linda L. Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome and 
Post-Traumatic Stress Response, in Ann. W. Burgess ed., Rape and Sexual Assault: A 
Research Handbook, Vol. 1, 46 (1985).
38. See, e.g., Lance P. Kelley, Frank W. Weathers, Meghan E. McDevitt-Murphy, David 
E. Eakin, & Amanda M. Flood, Comparison of PTSD Symptom Patterns in hree Types 
of Civilian Trauma, 22 J. Traumatic Stress 227 (2009).
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his is by no means conined to victims of stranger rape. Intimate partner 
violence involving rape or physical or sexual abuse has been found to be 
related to high levels of posttraumatic stress.39 Indeed, owing to the breach 
of trust frequently involved, nonstranger rape may have highly adverse 
consequences for victims (myth 5).40 Similarly, research into rape trauma 
syndrome has revealed that many victims have a controlled response when 
recounting what has happened to them. hey mask their feelings and ap-
pear calm and composed rather than hysterical and tearful (myth 10).41 
hat memory is afected by trauma is also well documented, so that a vic-
tim who has, for example, during rape dissociated from the experience, will 
have di culty at irst in recalling what happened or the order of events, 
but these may be recalled at a later stage.42 Inconsistency is thus not a sure 
indication of mendacity (myth 11). Numerous studies further demonstrate 
that victims of rape and sexual abuse have frequently been victimized more 
than once,43 so that myth 8 is clearly false.
Many myths are challengeable on more than one of the above grounds. 
For example, in terms of myth 1, not merely does the law of rape not require 
the perpetrator to be a stranger, but research shows that the overwhelming 
majority of rapes reported to the police and classiied and recorded by them 
as rape do not involve strangers.44 It cannot be supposed that the many 
thousands of men and women who report nonstranger rape are either 
39. Ann L. Coker, Rebecca Weston, Daniel Creson, Blair Justice & Patricia Blakeney, 
PTSD Symptoms Among Men and Women Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence: he 
Role of Risk and Protective Factors, 20 Violence & Victims 625 (2005).
40. See, e.g., Alan Clarke, Jo Moran-Ellis & Judith Sleney, Sentencing Advisory Panel 
Research Report 2, Attitudes To Date Rape and Relationship Rape: A Qualitative Study 
(2002).
41. See Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 37; Liat Sayfan, Emilie B.Mitchell, Gail 
S.Goodman, Mitchell S. Eisen & Jianjian Qin, Children’s Expressed Emotions When 
Disclosing Maltreatment, 32 Child Abuse & Neglect 1026 (2008).
42. See, e.g., Bessel A. van der Kolk & Rita Fisler, Dissociation and he Fragmentary 
Nature of Traumatic Memories: Overview and Exploratory Study, 8 J. Traumatic Stress 505 
(2006); Shannon Tromp, Mary P. Koss, Aurelio Jose Figueredo & Melinda haran, Are 
Rape Memories Diferent?: A Comparison of Rape, Other Unpleasant and Pleasant 
Memories among Employed Women, 8 J. Traumatic Stress, 607 (2006).
43. See, e.g., Catherine C.Classen, Oxana G. Palesh & R. Aggarwal, Sexual Revictimization: 
A Review of the Empirical Literature, 6 Trauma, Violence & Abuse 103 (2005).
44. See, e.g., Andy Feist, Jane Ash, Jane Lawrence, Duncan McPhee & Rachel Wilson, 
Investigating and Detecting Recorded Ofences of Rape, Home Oice Online Report, 12 
(2007), http://www.homeoice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/rdsolr1807.pdf.
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mistaken or have simply lied about their experiences. By the same token, 
quite apart from the fact that proof of injury is not a legal requirement of 
rape, most rapes do not in fact involve injuries to the victim.45
C. The Prevalence of Rape Myths and Their Impact  
on Decision-Making
Numerous studies now demonstrate that, despite the falsity of many be-
liefs about rape, such beliefs are widely held.46 Victim-blaming attitudes 
(see myth 6) were recently incorporated into oicial decision-making by 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, which ruled that awards to 
rape victims who had drunk alcohol at some stage prior to being raped 
should be reduced.47 his decision was subsequently revoked after media 
attention and government intervention, but it was not without its sup-
porters.48 Moreover, according to the Stern Review, awards are still being 
reduced on this ground as well as on the ground of a delay before making 
the complaint.49 Sara Payne has noted, on the basis of her discussions with 
the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, the inluence of stereotypes 
on decision making by both agencies. She mentioned in particular what 
might be described as the “not you again” problem—where oicers fail to 
deal with rapes efectively because the complainant has complained before 
(myth 8).50 John Yates, Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 
acting on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Oicers (ACPO), com-
missioned a team to look into the policing of rape in all 43 police forces 
in England and Wales with the result that “there has never been a better 
45. Id. at 21. See also United States Department of Justice, Full Report of the Prevalence, 
Incidence and Consequences of Violence against Women, Research Report iv (2000), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdiles1/nij/183781.pdf.
46. See, e.g., Temkin & Krahé, supra note 13, at ch. 2; Wake Up to Rape, supra note 33; 
Mary White Stewart, Shirley A. Dobbin & Sophia I. Gatowski, “Real Rapes” and “Real 
Victims”: he Shared Reliance on Common Cultural Deinitions of Rape, IV Feminist L. 
Stud. 159 (1996).
47. See Dozens More Rape Compensation Payouts Cut Because Victims Had Been 
Drinking, he London Times, Aug. 13, 2008.
48. See Compensation for Drunk Rape Victims, he London Times, Aug. 17, 2008.
49. See Stern Review, supra note 14, at 17.
50. Payne, supra note 25, at 13.
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picture of what is going on than we have now.”51 He concluded from this 
review that “cultural issues (myths and stereotyping) remain incredibly sig-
niicant,” particularly the view that “stranger rapes are serious, relationship/
acquaintance rapes are not.”52 In the courtroom the deployment of rape 
myths has been frequently noted.53 However, there has been no systematic 
mapping of their invocation at trial, and resulting no doubt from con-
straints on jury research, their precise impact on jury decision making is 
unclear. But studies with participants eligible for jury service suggest that 
those who score high on rape myth acceptance tend to bring these attitudes 
to bear when asked to make judgements about rape scenarios despite the 
facts of the case.54
I I I .  T H E  S E A R C H  F O R  S O L U T I O N S  I N  E N G L A N D  
A N D  W A L E S
In a Consultation Paper published in 2006, the Oice for Criminal Justice 
Reform outlined a proposal to amend the law to permit the prosecution to 
call general expert evidence to expose some of the false beliefs about rape.55 
It was envisaged that the expert would not comment on the complainant’s 
behavior or evidence and would not have examined her beforehand.56 he 
defense would be able to challenge this expert evidence through cross-
examination or by calling experts as well.57 he proposal attracted a mixed 
response,58 and the government concluded that it should be approached 
with caution, undertaking to continue to look into ways of allowing “myth 
busting” material to be presented in court.59 
Accordingly, a small committee headed by the Solicitor General was 
formed to take the matter further. his Committee looked at various options 
51. Yates, supra note 13, at 74.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (1996).
54. See, e.g., Temkin and Krahé, supra note 13, at part 2.
55. See Oice for Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 24, at ch. 4.
56. Id. at 19.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Oice for Criminal Justice Reform, Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims—
Justice for Victims of Rape: Response to Consultation, 14–18 (2007).
59. Id. at 20–21.
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including expert evidence, providing the jury with a video or lealet, and 
judicial directions. he latter has emerged for the time being as the irm 
favorite.60 he idea here is that in the summing-up to the jury at the end of 
the trial before it retires to consider its verdict, the judge should comment 
on certain false beliefs about rape that are relevant to that particular trial. In 
an interview with he Times, the Solicitor General revealed her decision to 
promote the idea of judicial directions to challenge some of the many rape 
myths listed above.61 he myths to be targeted were that genuine victims 
report at once (myth 9), that false allegations are common (myth 12),62 that 
most rapes are committed by strangers (myth 1), that stranger rape is more 
traumatic than rape by a known person (myth 5), that genuine victims put 
up a ight, show signs of struggle and sustain genital injuries (myth 2), and 
that consent to sex can be assumed from dress, lirting, or drink (myth 7). 
Some trial judges had already begun commenting in their summing-up 
about certain rape stereotypes, and a body of directions on rape stereotypes 
were subsequently formulated and incorporated in a set of materials by His 
Honour Judge Rook QC and the Judicial Studies Board (JSB) for those 
judges participating in the Serious Sexual Ofences Seminar.63 he deci-
sion of the Court of Appeal in Doody 64 provided a boost to this strategy 
by approving a direction that explained why victims do not always report 
immediately. 
Lord Justice Pitchford was also commissioned, as part of his task of 
reviewing all judicial directions in criminal cases, to consider directions 
on rape myths, building upon the work of the JSB. he culmination of 
his work in this area is Chapter 17 of the new Crown Court Benchbook,65 
which provides unequivocal and welcome recognition of the malign impact 
60. In England and Wales, at the end of a jury trial, the judge will give a detailed 
summing-up to the jury in which the law will be set out, the evidence in the case examined, 
and speciic directions given.
61. Beware Rape Myths, Judges to Tell Jurors, he London Times, June 15, 2009.
62. he idea of a judicial direction on false allegations has now been rejected.
63. Peter Rook, Sexual Ofences (Non-Consensual Cases and Ofences against Children): 
Examples of Directions to the Jury, Judicial Studies Board, September 2009. Unpublished 
materials kindly supplied to the author by His Honour Judge Rook QC.
64. See supra note 36 (both sources). For an exemplary direction on late reporting by 
victims of child sexual abuse upheld but not emphatically endorsed by the Court of Appeal, 
see MM, EWCA (Crim) 1558 [2007]. See also Breeze EWCA (Crim) 255 [2009], where the 
judge’s direction on late complaining led to a successful appeal.
65. Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Benchbook (2010).
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that stereotypes and myths can have in this area of the law.66 he chapter 
sets out a series of “Illustrations,” which he has developed and adapted 
from the directions already in use. heir purpose is to illustrate how a di-
rection might be given: “It is there to provide the reader with ideas, includ-
ing ideas as to how it can be improved.”67 he “Illustrations” are available 
for judges to use if they so wish. hey are aimed at cautioning juries against 
making certain unwarranted assumptions based on myths and stereotypes. 
hose covered relate to the stranger rape myth, the impact of trauma on 
demeanor when giving evidence, late reporting, the absence of force or the 
threat of force, lack of resistance, complainant behavior including dress and 
alcohol consumption, inconsistency in the complainant’s account, and the 
idea that rape is about sexual attraction. But judges remain free to word 
directions as they see it, so long as they keep to the main principles, which 
are to ensure that they do not implant in the jury’s mind any contrary as-
sumption or stray from the commonplace to the controversial and thus 
appear to be endorsing argument for one side at the expense of the other.68 
Judges may therefore in practice continue to draw upon the previous JSB 
materials. Any direction should be a matter for consultation having re-
ceived the views of both advocates beforehand.69 It is equally open to the 
judge to give no direction at all.
I V .  J U D I C I A L  I N S T R U C T I O N S :  C O M P R E H E N S I B I L I T Y
he move toward judicial instructions as the preferred option for addressing 
the problem of rape myths and stereotypes raises the question of whether this 
is likely to be efective. here is a substantial body of research on jury instruc-
tions in criminal trials in general. In an extensive review of the literature on 
jury research up to 2001, Darbyshire, Maughan, and Stewart state, “if there is 
one point upon which nearly every commentator agrees it is that juries have a 
great deal of di culty understanding and applying judicial instructions.”70
66. Id. ch. 17, at ¶ 4.
67. Id. introduction at viii.
68. Id. ch. 17, at ¶¶ 13, 14.
69. Id. at ¶ 14.
70. Penny Darbyshire, Andy Maughan & Angus Stewart, What Can the English Legal 
System Learn from Jury Research Published up to 2001? 25 (2001), http://sixthformlaw.
info/06_misc/pdf_iles/penny_darbyshire.pdf.
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Indeed, several authors have concluded that juror comprehension of 
judicial instructions is “abysmally low.”71 It has been pointed out that 
Americans have an average reading level of sixth to eighth grade,72 whilst 
Darbyshire and her colleagues note that the state of adult literacy in Great 
Britain cannot be regarded as much better.73 Steele and hornburg con-
cluded from their research that “jurors conscientiously try to follow their 
instructions but that most of those instructions cannot be understood by 
most jurors.”74 Darbyshire and colleagues consider that the reason for this 
is that instructions “are written only with an eye on the letter of the law 
and with little consideration of their comprehensibility.”75 hey criticize 
some judicial instructions for their complex syntax, noting that they may 
contain three or more paragraphs with sentences of ive or more lengthy 
clauses.76 his stands in stark contrast to the lealet that accompanies the 
summons to jury trial and the video that is also shown to jurors, which 
have been described by Robert Howe QC, a juror in a rape case,77 as “very 
simplistic” with “Postman Pat-style explanations.” He also commented af-
ter this experience:
In modern criminal cases the directions are often very complex. Yet the 
theory is that the jury is supposed to remember and understand these con-
voluted directions and then apply them to the facts. In most cases, this is 
probably a polite iction!78
Research using psycholinguistics has demonstrated that comprehensibility 
can be enhanced by reorganizing judicial instructions, minimizing sen-
tence length and complexity, using the active voice, avoiding jargon and 
71. See V. Gordon Rose & James R.P. Oglof, Evaluating the Comprehensibility of Jury 
Instructions: A Method and an Example, 25 (4) Law & Hum. Behav. 409, 411 (2001).
72. Bethany Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension 
Issues, 67 (3) Tenn. L. Rev. 701 (2000).
73. Darbyshire et al., supra note 70, at 26.
74. Walter W. Steele & Elizabeth G. hornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure 
To Communicate, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 77 (1988) at 77.
75. Darbyshire et al., supra note 70, at 25.
76. Id. at 26.
77. Lawyers are now allowed to sit on juries in England and Wales: Criminal Justice Act 
2003, Schedule 33.
78. Robert Howe, Too Much Legal Experience Can Subvert Jury Trial, he London 
Times, Dec. 3, 2009.
CHALLENGING RAPE  MYTHS IN  THE  COURTROOM | 7 2 3
uncommon words, and using concrete rather than abstract words.79 One 
study found that, without such reorganization, standard instructions were 
no better than no instructions.80 Most recently, in a study involving 797 
jurors who saw a simulated trial, it was found that only 31 percent actually 
fully understood the judge’s legal directions; with written instructions, this 
igure rose to 48 percent.81
Hence, unless great care is taken to ensure that jury instructions are 
drafted simply and clearly, there is a good chance that juries will miss the 
points being made. Indeed Darbyshire and colleagues state, “As a matter of 
common sense it seems obvious that when faced with a largely incompre-
hensible direction, the jury will tend to fall back on their prior knowledge 
of the law, which we know is largely incorrect.”82 It is equally likely that a 
less than clear instruction on rape myths will ensure that members of the 
jury will fall back on their existing assumptions.
he “Illustrations” in the new Crown Court Benchbook cannot be 
faulted as pieces of English prose. Indeed, they are models of elegance, 
sophistication, and literary style. However, whether a jury would be able 
to follow some of them is open to question. For example, the following 
direction is aimed at addressing the myths relating to inconsistency:
Every person who is a victim of rape sufers trauma to a greater or lesser de-
gree. he quality of our memory is afected by the ability of the mind to take 
in the details of the experience, register them and to recall them afterwards. 
Trauma can interfere with these processes. Experience tells us that the way in 
which trauma afects memory varies considerably. It may afect a person’s abil-
ity accurately to lay down in the memory, in the correct sequence, each of the 
constituent parts of the ordeal. If the trauma did have such an efect, the ability 
of the witness to recall events consistently is also likely to be afected in this 
way. After the event some people ruminate constantly on what happened and by 
that process reconstruct accurately or perhaps inaccurately the events which oc-
curred; others hate to confront their memories and do their best to avoid thinking 
about them. he result is that recall is not always consistent.83
79. See, e.g., Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors 
to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 Law & Soc’y Rev. 153 (1982).
80. Amiram Elwork, Bruce D. Sales & James J. Alini, Making Jury Instructions 
Understandable (1982).
81. homas, supra note 22, at 35–38.
82. Darbyshire et al., supra note 70, at 27.
83. Supra note 65, ch. 17 at 362 (italics added).
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Trial judges may want to adapt this “Illustration” since many jurors would 
ind some of this vocabulary beyond them (e.g., “ruminate”, “reconstruct,” 
“correct sequence”) and the direction as a whole, particularly the italicized 
sentences, too complex. However, judicial instructions contained in the 
JSB Materials suggest that trial judges too still struggle with comprehen-
sibility. he following example is a well-intentioned instruction about the 
dangers of stereotyping:
[1] Sitting on a jury requires you to put your emotions to one side and keep 
a cool head in judging the evidence dispassionately. [2] You may think that 
much of what I am about to say is simple common sense but it needs to be said 
so that every member of the jury has the same approach as a starting point be-
cause it is sometimes diicult for a jury to understand the way people act if there 
has indeed been a rape. [3] Forget generalisations or stereotypes you may have 
heard or read about in the media; the circumstances of the commission of 
serious sexual ofences and the reactions of victims to them are extremely 
varied.84
Some jurors would have di culty with the words “dispassionately”, “ste-
reotypes,” and “generalizations,” as well as with the rather long second 
sentence that contains a series of diferent ideas. Moreover, the use of the 
phrase “if there has indeed been a rape,” intended to be fair to the defen-
dant, will immediately cast doubt on the complainant’s story.
V .  J U D I C I A L  I N S T R U C T I O N S :  D I S L O D G I N G  F A L S E 
B E L I E F S
In seeking to use judicial directions to dislodge false beliefs about rape, 
comprehensibility is merely one of the hurdles to be overcome. It might 
be thought—and this would appear to be the underlying rationale of de-
ploying judicial instructions to counter rape myths—that “if people only 
thought enough about the issues at hand, considered all the relevant in-
formation and employed proper reasoning strategies, their decision-mak-
ing would surely improve”85 and their biases would fade away. Moreover, 
84. Supra note 63, 5 (numbering and italics added).
85. Norbert Schwarz, Lawrence J. Sanna, Ian Skurnik & Carolyn Yoon, Metacognitive 
Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications for Debiasing and 
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“models of rational choice assume that people will expend more time and 
efort on getting it right when the stakes are high.”86 However, the task of 
myth-busting is psychologically highly complex and fraught with danger. 
here is a considerable risk that a direction will have the opposite efect 
to that intended and serve to entrench rather than overcome stereotypes 
and myths in the minds of the jury. here is the risk of assimilation—that 
the judge’s instruction will be distorted by jurors to conform with their 
own existing attitudes. It is possible that those who adhere strongly to rape 
myths, who are most in need of being educated, will see their stereotypes 
reinforced rather than questioned by the direction.87 
Again, setting out a false belief and then proceeding to challenge it 
might be considered an efective way of dispelling myths. However, it has 
long been established that acceptance of erroneous beliefs often increases 
soon afterward where this method is used. As Schwarz and colleagues point 
out, this is because this “educational strategy focuses solely on information 
content, ignoring the metacognitive experiences that are part and parcel 
of the reasoning process.”88 In other words, reasoning processes are not 
solely determined by giving people the correct information but rely on 
factors such as how easy it is for a person to process both the wrong and 
the right information and bring either to mind subsequently. Schwarz and 
colleagues have demonstrated that “false information is better left alone. 
Any attempt to explicitly discredit false information necessarily involves a 
repetition of the false information which may contribute to its later famil-
iarity and acceptance.”89 By providing people with false information and 
then attempting to discredit it, the false information has been inserted in a 
person’s memory bank and may be recalled later on—particularly if by its 
nature it is easy to recall—and may be used in preference to the informa-
tion given to discredit it. By the same token, if myths are repeated, they 
are rendered familiar when they are encountered again not long afterward. 
Familiar statements are more likely to be accepted as true than rejected 
as false. Research by Skurnik, Yoon, and Schwarz has demonstrated that 
the attempt to debunk myths by setting out erroneous beliefs and then 
Public Information Campaigns, 39 Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. 127, 127 
(2007).
86. Id. at 128.
87. See Temkin and Krahé, supra 13, at 205.
88. Schwarz et al., supra note 85, at 128.
89. Id. at 146.
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confronting them with facts facilitates the acceptance of the myths after 
a delay of only thirty minutes.90 his is particularly likely to be a problem 
with older adults whose memory has declined and who rely increasingly 
on familiarity. hus “repeating false information . . . may put older adults 
at a particular risk essentially turning warnings into recommendations.”91 
Moreover, attempts made by a highly credible source to inform people 
that a given claim is false may also have the unintended efect that the 
false claim is eventually associated with the highly credible source and thus 
becomes more inluential.92
When applying this research to sincere attempts by the judiciary to 
counter rape myths, one particular pitfall becomes clear: there is a danger 
that where a judicial direction focuses on the beliefs about rape that are 
false, this may have the opposite efect to that which is intended. Moreover, 
since a judge is a highly credible source, this may increase acceptance of the 
false belief. Hence, judicial instructions that do not apply these research 
insights may inadvertently carry with them considerable dangers. he fol-
lowing included in the JSB materials on the impact of nonstranger rape 
provides an illustration:
[1] A woman (or a man) who has been subjected to a sexual assault obviously 
undergoes a traumatic experience, irrespective of whether they know or have had 
previous consensual sex with their assailant. [2] On irst thought, you might 
think that the stranger rape would be far more traumatic, violent and frighten-
ing, but this may not be the case. [3] he trauma experienced by a victim of 
rape may afect the manner or demeanour of their evidence, which may be 
diferent to the way you would expect them to give    evidence. [4] hey may 
display visible signs of having experienced a trauma or they may not. You must, 
therefore, put to one side how you may expect [the complainant] to appear 
when she/he is giving evidence, and consider that people react in very dif-
ferent ways if they have indeed been raped.93
In this direction, sentence 2 invokes the myth directly, bringing it to the 
mind of the jury just before it begins its deliberations. It not merely sets 
out the false idea about rape, but highlights it by placing it at the start of 
the sentence and by elaborating and reinforcing it with the words “far more 
90. Cited in Schwarz et al. supra note 85, at 147.
91. Id. at 151.
92. Id.
93. Supra note 63, 6 (numbering and italics added).
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traumatic, violent and frightening.” All that is said to counter the myth is 
contained in the laconic inal subclause, “this may not be the case.” hese 
six words can do little to displace the bold statement contained in the main 
body of the sentence. Quite unintentionally, the direction would appear to 
be ideally formulated to ensure that the false claim it highlights becomes 
more rather than less inluential and to assist assimilation.94 Again, sentence 
4 is likely to have a similar efect. he false belief that a complainant will 
necessarily show visible signs of trauma is highlighted at the beginning of 
the sentence and is only countered with the four words at the end of the 
sentence, “or they may not.”95
A. R v. Doody 96
he decision of the Court of Appeal in Doody in 2008 was hailed as giving 
the green light to the use of judicial directions to counter rape myths. he 
direction on late complaining approved by the Court of Appeal and praised 
by the Stern Review was as follows:
[1] Experience shows that people react diferently to the trauma of a serious 
sexual assault. here is no one classic response. [2] he defence say that the 
reason that the complainant did not report this until her boyfriend re-
turned from Dubai ten days after the incident is because she has made up 
a false story. [3] hat is a matter for you. [4] You may think that some people 
may complain immediately to the irst person they see, whilst others may feel 
shame and shock and not complain for some time. [5] A late complaint does not 
necessarily mean it is a false complaint. hat is a matter for you.97
Before Doody, trial judges had for some time been cautiously addressing 
the issue of late complaining98 but always in the shadow of the Court of 
Appeal. he above direction was thus understandably tentative. he dif-
iculty for the judge is to safeguard the defendant’s position whilst attempt-
ing to counter the myth. In this direction, sentence 2 gives prominence to 
the idea that the allegation may well be false, and sentence 5 also tends to 
reinforce the myth by suggesting that a late complaint may very well be 
94. See text at supra note 87.
95. Jurors may also be unfamiliar with words such as “demeanor” and “assailant.”
96. See supra note 36.
97. Supra note 36, [2009] Crim. L. Rev. 591 at 593 (numbering and italics added); Stern 
Review, supra note 14, at 93.
98. See, e.g., Temkin and Krahé, supra note 13, at 164.
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false, although this is not invariably the case. It is only in sentence 4 that 
the myth of late complaining is broached and then only very gingerly, so 
that its myth-busting potential is strictly limited. he point is not that 
some people “may” complain immediately and some “may” feel shame and 
shock, but that some people do complain immediately, whilst others do 
feel shame and shock and do not complain immediately. hese are matters 
of fact. However, what is also true is that a late complaint may be a false 
complaint. It is up to the jury to decide which it is.
Some judges henceforth may adopt the Doody formula, whilst oth-
ers may prefer the rather more elaborate “Illustration” set out in the new 
Benchbook: 
It has been said on behalf of the defendant that the fact that the complain-
ant did not report what had happened to her as soon as possible makes it 
less likely that the complaint she eventually made was true. Whether that 
is so in this particular case is a matter for you to consider and resolve. 
However, it would be wrong to assume that every person who has been the 
victim of a sexual assault will report it as soon as possible. he experience 
of the courts is that victims of sexual ofences can react to the trauma in 
diferent ways. Some, in distress, or anger, may complain to the irst person 
they see. Others, who react with shame or fear or shock or confusion, do 
not complain or go to authority for some time. It takes a while for self-
conidence to reassert itself. here is, in other words, no classic or typical 
response. A late complaint does not necessarily signify a false complaint, any 
more than an immediate complaint necessarily demonstrates a true complaint. 
It is a matter for you to determine whether, in the case of this particular com-
plainant, the lateness of the complaint, such as it is, assists you at all and, if so, 
what weight you attach to it. You need to consider what the complainant 
herself said about her experience and her reaction to it.99
Once again the prose is lawless and elegant. However, the sheer sophistica-
tion with which the ideas are expressed and the elaborate sentence structure 
in the italicized sentences arguably render it unsuitable for jury consump-
tion. he same ideas could perhaps be set out more simply as follows:
Experience shows that people react in diferent ways to the trauma of a 
serious sexual assault. Some people do not complain immediately to any-
one. his may be for a variety of reasons. hey may feel shame or guilt. 
99. Supra note 65, ch. 17 at 358 (italics added).
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hey may be too shocked or upset to tell anyone. hey may fear upsetting 
their family. But other people feel diferently and will complain to the po-
lice straight away. It will just depend on the person and her particular situ-
ation and the circumstances of the case. he defence says that the reason 
that the complainant did not report immediately after the incident is be-
cause she has made up a false story. his may be the case but there may be 
other reasons why she delayed reporting. It is for you to decide.
B. Judicial Directions: Further Problems and Limitations
A further problem with judicial directions on rape myths is that there is 
no guarantee that they will be delivered efectively or at all. Experience in 
New South Wales testiies to this.100 Chapter 17 of the new Crown Court 
Benchbook is undoubtedly a laudable development, but it leaves judges to 
make their own decisions on whether to use directions and, if so, how to 
express them. Clearly judicial education is central here, and there is every 
indication that the Judicial Studies Board in England and Wales is keen to 
promote this.
Even assuming that judicial directions were worded to maximize their 
impact as myth-busting tools and that judges were uniformly enthusiastic 
about applying them, it must be recognized that what can be achieved by 
this approach is likely to be limited. he use of heuristics or shortcuts, of 
which stereotyping is a manifestation, is a very fundamental way in which 
people reach decisions. People tend to rely on the information that comes 
most readily to mind, and for many people, rape stereotypes fall into that 
category. But it is not only myths and stereotypes that are included in heu-
ristics. People also use scripts to describe how the world is and how it works. 
Recent research by Ellison and Munro vividly illustrates the application of 
these scripts in sexual cases.101 Scripts include both descriptive elements and 
normative elements specifying expected behaviors in a given situation.102 
hus, there are scripts for rape and scripts for normal sex that involve 
100. For further discussion of the New South Wales experience of judicial instructions 
in rape cases, see J. Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process 193–94 (2002).
101. Louise Ellison & Vanessa Munro, Of “Normal Sex” and “Real Rape”: Exploring the 
Use of Socio-Sexual Scripts in (Mock) Jury Deliberation, 18 Soc. & Legal Stud. 291 
(2009).
102. Barbara Krahé, Stefen Bieneck & Renate Scheinberger-Olwig, he Role of Sexual 
Scripts in Sexual Aggression and Victimisation, 36 Archives Sexual Behav. 687, 687 
(2007).
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expectations of what happens in both situations. hese may involve entirely 
false ideas about rape. Another widely used heuristic is counterfactual think-
ing, which describes the process of mentally undoing events by imagining 
conditions under which an outcome opposite to the one observed could 
have been brought about.103 In rape cases this can lead to the attribution 
of blame to the complainant for what happened. he hindsight bias can 
have a similar efect.104 hus there is an array of diferent biases that may 
come into play in a rape case, many of which cannot suitably be tackled in 
judicial directions. Of those that can be, it would be optimistic indeed to 
think that they are likely to be fully dislodged by a couple of sentences in 
the judge’s summing up at the very end of the trial.
C. Empirical Research on Judicial Directions in Rape Cases
Empirical research can ofer insights into the possible efects of judicial 
directions. Recently, Ellison and Munro have attempted to assess the im-
pact of jury education in a mock jury study involving nine mini-trial sce-
narios.105 Each mini-trial lasted 75 minutes and was observed by 24–26 
participants divided into three mock juries (27 juries in total). he mini-
trials were played out by actors and barristers in three sets of three trials. 
In one set, the complainant’s demeanor when giving her evidence was lat 
and unemotional, in another set she complained late, and in the third set, 
she failed to resist her assailant. In each set of three, jury education was 
attempted in two trials but not in the third. Jury education took the shape 
of an expert in one trial and a judicial instruction designed to counter the 
myth in the second trial. hus, a judicial instruction was given in three 
trials involving nine juries. he authors do not set out the precise wording 
of the instructions given, and it may therefore be possible that they could 
have been worded more efectively,106 but attempts were made to ensure 
they were clearly expressed and, following the guidance in Doody, that the 
defense case was properly represented.107
103. See Temkin and Krahé, supra note 13, at 49–50.
104. Id.
105. Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, Turning Mirrors into Windows?: Assessing the 
Impact of (Mock) Juror Education in Rape Trials, 49 Brit. J. Criminol. 363 (2009).
106. See preceding text, at “Judicial Instructions: Dislodging False Beliefs.”
107. Supra note 105, at 366–67.
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he methodology used in this study was far removed from an actual 
trial, but this is in many ways its strength. Mock jurors were asked simply 
to concentrate for 75 minutes. he judge’s summing-up was brief compared 
to a normal summing-up, consisting simply of judicial directions on the 
law and the relevant myth, so that these were given far greater salience than 
in a normal trial. Hence, with an uncluttered summing-up, the research 
was well placed to ascertain whether a judicial direction is capable of hav-
ing any impact. he results disclosed that the majority of jurors who had 
received the judicial direction were less inclined to be inluenced adversely 
by a complainant who had given an emotionally lat performance or one 
who had reported late than jurors who had received no such instruction, 
although the number of jurors in each category was small. For example, 
where no judicial instruction was given, 15 jurors (58 percent) adhered to 
the myths about late reporting, but this number declined to 6 (23 percent) 
in the group where jurors received instruction. However, the myth that rape 
victims will ight back and incur injuries in doing so proved impossible to 
shift, and the mock jurors were uninluenced by the judicial direction.108
he authors draw positive conclusions from the research as far as juror 
education is concerned on the basis that post-trial deliberations showed 
greater awareness of the issues surrounding rape where this took place. It 
is di cult however to share this optimism. Given that the format of the 
study created an environment that was more conducive than a real trial 
to jurors engaging with judicial instructions, it is disappointing that the 
directions had no impact in one out of three scenarios. It is also of inter-
est that, for the most part, juries did not discuss the legal tests, and when 
they did, there was “ample evidence of misunderstanding.”109 “Participants 
often candidly acknowledged, during the deliberations, that they had not 
understood the legal directions provided,” with one juror noting that he 
had not been listening since “the content ‘was going over the top of my 
head.’”110 Since one way of combating some of the myths of rape is to em-
phasize the requirements and the nonrequirements of the legal deinition, 
this is hardly encouraging. Moreover, the researchers found that in the vast 
108. Id. at 371.
109. Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, Getting to Not Guilty: Examining Jurors 
Deliberative Processes in and Beyond the Context of a Rape Trial, 30 Legal Stud. 74, 94 
(2010).
110. Id. at 95.
|  N E W  C R I M I N A L  L A W  R E V I E W  | VO L .  13  |  N O .  4  |  FALL  20107 3 2
majority of trials in the study, there was a shift away from conviction by 
the time deliberations had concluded. “A sizeable minority of jurors who 
indicated a guilty verdict at the start of deliberations ultimately voted not 
guilty . . . only one juror shifted from a preliminary not guilty position 
to one of guilty at the close of the deliberation process. In addition, those 
jurors who were initially undecided as to verdict were signiicantly more 
likely to vote not guilty in the inal poll.”111 Hence, in the inal analysis, it 
would appear that whatever the quality of jury deliberations, juror educa-
tion was yielding little in terms of conviction rates.
he Ellison and Munro research does not make the case for judicial di-
rections as a means of myth-busting that will lead to improved conviction 
rates. Indeed, it may conidently be predicted that, in the context of real 
trials, their impact would be very much less than it was in the study. In 
real life, a simple trial involving a single defendant is likely to take around 
5 days or more. Trials involving more than one defendant or complainant 
will take much longer, and are likely to last for a fortnight or more. he 
judge’s summing-up is given after the jury has heard all the evidence and 
been given ample opportunity over the course of days to harden its views. 
In the summing-up, which is likely to take from one and half to two hours 
or more in longer trials, the judge will mainly be concerned with examin-
ing all the evidence in the trial and explaining the law. No more than a 
paragraph will be devoted to myths. hus, the adage “too little, too late” 
might be thought to apply.
D. Judicial Directions: The Way Forward
It seems unlikely that judicial directions relating to rape myths will have 
much impact on conviction rates. here is however something to be said 
for them. hey do involve a public recognition from an authoritative 
source that some commonly held beliefs about rape are false. hey would 
thus take their place as one in a number of diferent strategies that can be 
deployed to dismantle the structure of damaging untruths about rape that 
exists in our society. Furthermore, they are important in terms of the com-
plainant’s experience in court. As Sara Payne has pointed out, the women 
interviewed for her review felt let down in some way by the system “not 
111. Id. at 83. Out of 27 trials, 18 of which had involved some form of jury education, 
only 5 resulted in a conviction, but the authors do not specify which trials these were.
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because they had expected a conviction in every case but because they had 
been made to feel ashamed and responsible.”112 
To be useful, it is suggested that judicial directions need to follow sev-
eral basic principles. First, they must be clear and simple. Language is all 
important. Long or elaborate sentences and di cult words should all be 
avoided. Secondly, it is obvious that diferent myths need to be challenged 
in diferent ways.113 Some beliefs about rape are always false, and some have 
no bearing on criminal liability. For example, the crime of rape does not 
require proof of force, injury, or violence.he false assumption that it does 
can clearly be challenged in an unequivocal voice, and there would seem to 
be no objection to such directions being handed over in written form to the 
jury. Likewise, it can be made very clear that the complainant’s “contribu-
tory negligence” has no bearing on the issue of consent, as in the following 
suggested direction, which covers a variety of diferent situations: 
You cannot assume that a woman is consenting to sex just because of the 
way she is dressed. You cannot assume that a woman is consenting to sex 
with a person just because she went to that person’s home. You cannot as-
sume that a woman is consenting to sex just because she was lirting or 
kissing. You cannot assume that a woman is consenting to sex just because 
she had sex with the same man on some other occasion.114
On the other hand, some myths involve beliefs that may or may not be 
true given the circumstances. For example, it is a false belief that incon-
sistency necessarily means that the complainant is lying, and this needs to 
be pointed out; but an inconsistent complainant may be lying, and her 
inconsistency may be an indication of this. Clearly, a diferent approach is 
required here, and in such cases a written instruction is possibly, though 
not necessarily, less appropriate. 
hirdly, judicial instructions need to avoid the pitfalls revealed by the 
science of attitude change.115 hus, for example, it may be counterproduc-
tive to draw too much attention to false beliefs in an attempt to displace 
112. Payne, supra note 25, at 8.
113. See preceding text, at “False Beliefs about Rape.”
114. Only the relevant behavior would need to be mentioned. It is suggested that the new 
“Illustration” on complainant behavior is too weak to have much impact; supra note 65, 
ch. 17 at 361.
115. he advertising campaign by the Association of Chief Police Oicers in December 
2009 heeds many of the lessons learned from research into media campaigns: see he London 
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them. Finally, there are some myths that research has exploded but the 
indings of which are counterintuitive and insuiciently familiar in the 
public domain. hese include those relating to memory, consistency, and 
multiple abuse experiences. In such cases expert evidence that afords the 
opportunity for greater explanation would be a useful adjunct to a judicial 
instruction. Indeed, whatever its limitations, expert evidence, coming as it 
does within the body of the trial, also has a greater chance of being attended 
to before the jury has made up its mind than a judicial instruction.116
C O N C L U S I O N
he justice gap will not be breached solely by tackling the myths of rape. 
he power of the myths is but one of many outstanding problems in the 
processing of rape cases by the criminal justice system.117 However myth-
busting is an essential activity that needs to be undertaken within society 
at large, particularly in schools, as well as in the context of education of the 
police, barristers, and judges. he advantage of such educational programs 
is that they can be carried out at a pace that allows for discussion and de-
bate. he courtroom context is plainly very diferent. Judicial instructions 
to juries on rape myths is a well-meant and worthwhile development but 
one that must be approached cautiously for fear of making things worse 
rather than better for complainants. 
Times, Nov. 30, 2009. See also, Police Launch National Rape Awareness Campaign, http://
inform.glam.ac.uk/news/2009/12/03/police-launch-national-rape-awareness-campaign/.
116. Research suggests that jurors form views about the verdict early on in the trial: 
see, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: he Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal, 21 
St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 85 (2002).
117. See, e.g., Yates, supra note 13, and Stern Review, supra note 14.
